Small wars and people’s wars: a Clausewitzian perpective on the South African War, 1899–1902 by Labuschagne, Pieter
21
SMALL WARS AND PEOPLE’S WARS: A 
CLAUSEWITZIAN PERPECTIVE ON THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN WAR, 1899–1902 
Pieter Labuschagne
Department of Political Sciences
UNISA
Abstract
The theorist and strategist Carl von Clausewitz developed core theoretical 
concepts on war, including that war is merely an extension of politics by different 
means, and that the integration of morality and rationality functions as a driving force 
in a people’s war. Clausewitz envisaged the idea of war in its absolute perfection 
(‘beautiful wars’) as a regulative ideal, which formed part of his framework on small 
wars and people’s wars. The aim of this article is to demonstrate how Clausewitz’s 
theories on small wars, and their transformation into people’s wars, are still valuable 
when analysing and contextualising historical events and battles. The value of 
Clausewitz’s theories on small wars and people’s wars is demonstrated by applying 
them to the general characteristics of the South African War of 1899–1902. The way 
Clausewitz differentiates between the underpinning reasons for war, and between 
‘limited’ and ‘absolute’ war, is specifically relevant for understanding the different 
tactics which commanders adopted in the field of battle. The theoretical distinction 
that Clausewitz makes between the objectives of two opposing forces could clarify 
why the British Empire and the two Boer Republics went to war. The same distinction 
might explain the motives and the impetus that gave rise to divergent views, and how 
the subsequent conflict developed into a full-scale war. 
Introduction
General Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), an avid analyst of small wars and 
people’s wars, is generally acknowledged as one the greatest writers on the theory of 
war. This is an astonishing achievement, especially as he wrote only one major work 
during his career, On War [Vom Kriege]. This publication represents the culmination of 
his theories, which he himself referred to as “a shapeless mass of ideas”.58 Yet, despite 
Clausewitz’s modesty, he had an undeniably dominant global impact on theories 
about war for an extended period. The American strategist, Barnard Brodie, made 
the bold statement that Clausewitz’s “work is not simply the greatest, but the only 
book about war”.59 In the field of academics, many prominent scholars and experts on 
international relations and strategic studies, including Raymond Aron, have attached 
significant prominence to Clausewitz’s theories in their textbooks.60 
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As Scheipers indicates, it was inevitable that in recent reconfigurations, the 
contextualisation of Clausewitz’s theories on war would distance him from the twenty-
first-century theoretical-strategic context.61 Herberg-Rothe refers to studies since the 
1990s, where influential writers on the theory of war have argued that Clausewitz’s 
theories are no longer applicable, not only in relation to contemporary conflicts, but 
also in general. Van Creveld (1991) is even more forthright in describing Clausewitz’s 
theories as harmful, while Keegan (1993) goes so far as to describe Clausewitz’s ideas 
as destructive.62 The common denominator in criticisms of Clausewitz’s theoretical 
propositions is their focus on conventional wars between two ‘regular’ armies. The 
authors point out that in the modern era, the character and fabric of war are multifaceted 
and involve a wider range of role players, including non-state actors. than.63
It is conceivable that Clausewitz’s contribution to the theoretic-strategic aspects 
of warfare will lose some status; yet, despite his theories falling out of favour, his 
theoretical insights remain enduring and remarkable, and should be understood and 
appreciated in the appropriate historical context. His ideas are still relevant, even 
though military conditions and warfare have modernised and transformed beyond all 
recognition. Contemporary developments do not warrant the proposal that his ideas 
be dismissed out of hand. If Clausewitz’s writings were to become redundant because 
of global changes and modernisation, then Aristotle’s theories on the state should 
similarly be dismissed for having been based on a comparative study of ancient city-
states situated around the Mediterranean in about 300 bc.64 
Daase labels the criticisms against Clausewitz “intellectual ignorance.”65 He 
points out that even authors who defend Clausewitz, attack his critics rather than 
pointing out his analytical strengths. Daase explains that the new forms of warfare 
underscore Clausewitz’s contemporary relevance, and that his ideas on ‘small wars’ 
allow a sophisticated approach to political violence.66 Within this scope, contrary to 
some contemporary views, Clausewitz’s theoretical propositions still have relevance 
and value, specifically in helping to differentiate between ‘small wars and ‘people’s 
wars’ It is thus the purpose of this article to demonstrate how his theories on small 
wars, and their transformation into people’s wars, make a valuable contribution to any 
analysis that aims to contextualise historical events and small wars. 
Aim of the article 
It was pointed out in the introduction that Clausewitz’s thoughts on small wars and 
people’s wars remain contemporary and relevant as analytical tools. The aim of this 
article is to demonstrate the value of Clausewitz’s theories by applying their general 
characteristics as a theoretical construct to explain the dynamics and inherent facets 
of the South African War of 1899–1902. The South African War displayed multiple 
dimensions for analysis because it was conducted between two unequal opponents 
– the mighty British Empire and two smallish Boer Republics (the South African 
Republic [Transvaal] and the Orange Free State Republic) and between a modern 
professional army and a militia or a ‘people’s army’. For the Boer Republics, it was 
a war on their own territory, for their freedom and independence – which Clausewitz 
deemed the most beautiful type of war. 
Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies, Vol 47, Nr 1, 2019. doi: 10.5787/47-1-1265
23
The value of Clausewitz’s views and theories on small wars and people’s wars is 
that these theories and views offer additional, intriguing strategic and military insight 
into the defining aspects of the South African War. His eighteenth-century theoretical 
conceptualisations find an echo in the salient features of that war more than a century 
later. The distinction Clausewitz draws between the underpinning reasons for war 
and the differences between ‘limited’ and ‘absolute’ war necessitates a focus on the 
different tactics adopted by the respective commanders. Clausewitz’s eighteenth-
century theoretical disposition and the distinction he made in terms of a war between 
a professional army and a ‘people’s army’ is invaluable for the analysis undertaken in 
the study on which this article reports. 
According to Scholtz, Clausewitz’s reference to a Landwehr is a concept that 
could be equated with the concept of a civil force or a ‘people’s army. The civil force 
is an extraordinary voluntarily force consisting of the whole of society, with all their 
physical and inner strength, their assets and goodwill – these assets form the basis of 
the Landwehr.67 
The theoretical distinction between the objectives of the two opposing forces 
makes it possible to explain why the British Empire and the two Boer Republics 
went to war in the first place. That same distinction explains the impetus that led to 
divergent views forming, and the way the subsequent fighting developed into a full-
scale conflict.
Structure of the article
The stated aim of the article is to expound how Clausewitz’s theories could be 
applied to facets of the South African War. The aim is to explain how a people’s army 
fought a people’s war, for their independence and freedom, which sprang from the 
concept of aestheticism as a combination of morality/passion and reason. 
The next subsection will outline the distinction between limited and absolute war, 
with reference to the difference between the strategic approaches of the British Empire 
and the Boer Republics. The differences will be explained with specific reference to 
the aim of the British Empire to extend its imperial policy and, in direct opposition, 
the Boer Republics’ aspirations for complete emancipation from British domination.
The next subsection provides an outline of the inner individual motivation of the 
average Boer in the militia, having morality as a defining trait. The resolve of the 
Boer militia was strengthened by a unique blend of morality and rationality, coupled 
with strong religious convictions. It is also explained that subsequent events during 
the war progressively undermined the rational and later moral beliefs of the Boers 
to continue fighting. In the conclusion of this article, final comments are offered to 
explain that the events, such as the Boer defeat at Paardenberg and the surrender of 
4 000 men, served to demoralised the Boers, and started the process of abandonment 
of a concerted resistance against the professional British army. 
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Theoretical underpinning
The level of intensity shown by those individuals who fought a people’s war to 
secure their own independence and freedom, sprang from the concept of aestheticism. 
The aesthetic disposition shows efficacious interaction between morale/passion and 
reason as a central tenet, and in this instance, it provided the driving force energising 
the men on the battlefield. Those who fought on this basis were imbued with the 
ideals and moral disposition to defend their own soil vigorously.68 In Clausewitz’s 
theoretical assumption, the ‘most beautiful of wars’ thus relates to the intrinsic 
presence of moral and aesthetic elements that are inherent in those willing to defend 
their motherland against invading aggressors. Clausewitz emphasises that small wars 
transform from partisan wars into people’s wars if they are underpinned and supported 
by a combination of reason (rationality) and morality, which legitimises and propels 
citizens’ resistance. 
Within a broader context, an illustrative comparison can be drawn between the 
political and military-strategic positions of the two Boer Republics at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century when their independence and very survival were at stake on 
the one hand, and the situation in Prussia a century earlier on the other. Clausewitz’s 
views on Prussia’s political and strategic challenges included his notion of a people’s 
war as involving citizens defending their country/nation against an aggressor.69 In the 
two former Boer Republics, the same salient features of a people’s war were present 
when Afrikaners fought to preserve their independence and maintain their sovereignty. 
In terms of the Clausewitzian aesthetic context, the forces of the two republics were 
imbued with a sense or an awareness of the legitimacy of their course of action, based 
not only on rational grounds, but also on an interrelationship with morality. 
During the first few months of the war, the two Boer Republics were able to 
draw on strong feelings of unity and solidarity in defence of their sovereignty. Their 
defence was underpinned by a moral justification of their cause, based on firm notions 
of morality and rationality. The Boer militia were convinced they were fighting ‘for 
the right reasons’ and ‘rationally believed’ in their own military prowess. It was 
this combination of morality and rationality that motivated and united the Boer 
militia and, for them, legitimised their struggle. These strong convictions resulted 
in remarkable victories during the last few months of 1899 over the British forces 
at Colenso, Stormberg and Magersfontein. However, the defeat and capitulation 
of General AP Cronjé at Paardenberg on 27 February1900 (Majuba Day) was a 
watershed and turning point in the war. The demoralising effect of the surrender of 
almost 4 000 men was a devastating blow to the Boer fighters. In the weeks following 
this loss, the interrelationship between rationality and morality that had underpinned 
and legitimised the Boers’ war up to that point was shattered by the surrender at 
Paardenberg and the strategic blunder made by the two presidents during the aftermath 
of the battle. 
Paardenberg represented another watershed juncture in the history of the Boer 
militia. It manifested as a split between those who wished to continue and those 
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demanding a ceasefire or a halt to the fighting. The division amongst the Boer militia 
pitted the diehards (bittereinders) (who believed that the war should continue on 
rational and moral grounds) against the ‘joiners’ (Boers who, as the name suggests, 
joined the British forces in various capacities), and the ‘hands-uppers’ (those raising 
their hands in surrender) who harboured opposing views. This bitter split resembled 
the start of a civil war, in that a number of Boers were killed by the actions of the 
‘joiners’ – their erstwhile compatriots – and for decades after the war, this betrayal 
reverberated through the districts.70 The division that occurred eroded the moral fabric 
of a people’s war and fragmented the solidarity of the two republics, rendering them 
unable to resist the invaders as the war progressed. As Warwick indicates, there is 
little doubt that in legal terms, the ‘joiners’ were regarded as wartime traitors.71
Distinction between the Clausewitzian ‘limited’ and ‘absolute’ war and 
perspectives on the South African War 
In a letter to the German philosopher Johann Fichte in 1869, Clausewitz outlines 
his perspectives on the broad spectrum of war, comparing the notion of the ‘most 
unfortunate of wars’ (seen from the perspective of the occupying powers) with the 
‘most beautiful of wars’ (in which people fight on their own territory for their freedom 
and independence).72 
From this proposition, Clausewitz then deduces the tendency of fighting to 
escalate to absolute war – a process which he terms the ‘dialectics of the contest’73 
He postulates that it is unavoidable that when one side attempts to dictate the law to 
another with the intention to enforce its will, there will be a reciprocal action, which 
will then logically lead to an escalation and ultimately an extreme form of warfare, 
i.e. absolute war.74
In terms of Clausewitz’s theoretical thinking, the motivating factors in each form 
of war differ fundamentally. The difference between the two strategic approaches 
is that the underpinning motive of the occupying force is to fight to eliminate the 
opponent’s political independence, while the defending force fights to preserve its 
freedom and independence. In the event of the defender being unable to repel the 
occupier, the former is compelled to fight to obtain favourable terms to secure peace.75 
In addition to studying the differences between two opposing commanders’ strategic 
approaches, Clausewitz emphasises the importance of understanding their ultimate 
aims as well as the strategies they used.76 
Daase refers to Clausewitz’s definition of small wars as the application of 
organised and unorganised violence by non-state actors against military forces to 
harass and exhaust the enemy’s army in order to change its policy.77 
An important aspect is Clausewitz’s differentiation as both these wars (‘small 
wars and people’ war) being the opposite of absolute war. To this end, Clausewitz 
refers to the seventeenth-century tradition of German philosophical and aesthetic 
discourse (see earlier) to emphasise the fundamental importance of the integration or 
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interrelationship between passion and reason as an underpinning factor in small wars 
and people’s wars. At that time, Prussia’s survival was at stake, and the importance 
of integrating logic and fervour was paramount, if the Prussians wanted to repel the 
danger of the invading German forces.78 
Clausewitz makes a clear distinction between absolute and limited war: the 
former aims to eliminate the enemy’s political independence, while the latter hopes to 
obtain favourable terms of peace. To this end, Clausewitz urges a commander to know 
whether he is fighting “the kind of war that is completely governed and saturated by 
the urge for a decision or one that approximated rather to ‘a war of observation”79
The compelling reasons why the British Empire and the two Boer Republics went 
to war in 1899 differ on a fundamental level from the aforementioned Clausewitzian 
classification. The British Empire engaged in war because it was the next logical step 
in its imperial policy, following the Anglo-Transvaal War of 1880–1881. That war 
had resulted in humiliation for the British and the annihilation of General Colley’s 
forces at Amajuba. The British government’s imperialistic perspective ideologically 
dominated and defined its outlook on international relations during the nineteenth 
century. In direct contrast, the Transvaal Republic had clearly stated its ambitions for 
complete emancipation from British domination, which was given further impetus by 
the discovery of gold on the Witwatersrand. The advantages of an influx of money to 
the Transvaal Treasury reinforced the republic’s autonomy, and this was disconcerting 
for the expansive hopes of the British imperialists.80
The republic’s impetus to strive for complete emancipation from British rule was 
thus incompatible with the imperialists’ policy and ambitions to establish supremacy 
over most of Southern Africa. The Transvaal’s separatist policies and dreams were 
disquieting to the imperial leaders, who envisaged the possible future impact thereof 
on the British colonies of Natal and the Cape. This predictably led to a widening of 
the rift. The Boer leaders, Presidents Paul Kruger and MT Steyn, realised after the 
collapse of the Bloemfontein Conference on 5 June 1899 that no solution regarding 
their differences with the British government, other than capitulation, was possible. 
The failure of these talks made the two Boer presidents realise that their independence 
was a stake, and that only war would preserve their independence from Britain’s 
imperialistic policies.81 It was during the failed Bloemfontein Conference that Kruger 
blurted out to the British High Commissioner, “it is our country that you want”.82 
The Boer leadership realised they would have to resist the British Empire’s 
imperialistic agenda through armed struggle; yet, in spite of their awareness of the 
threat posed by the British, the Transvaal Republic’s preparation for the upcoming 
war was restricted and rather limited in scope. Jan Smuts, Attorney General of the 
Transvaal Republic, was tasked with drafting a memorandum as a basis for preparing 
for the looming war. To this end, he provided the government with a blueprint for 
political, economic and military action. Smuts adopted a propagandistic/diplomatic 
approach to the war, being of the opinion that many subjects of the British Empire 
were antagonistic towards their rulers. He believed their loyalty was divided, and that 
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this would weaken the efforts by the empire to subdue the republics. Smuts was also of 
the opinion that the empire and the imperial structures were overextended and would 
be tested if compelled to wage a drawn-out war in Southern Africa.83
Smuts was, in the light of the two variables, propagandistic and diplomatic, in 
favour of a propagandistic approach intended to stir up the populace in the two British 
colonies, Natal and the Cape, to oppose the war. He also believed that the Afrikaners 
in the two republics and in the two colonies could fight a ‘people’s war’. To this 
end, he suggested in his memorandum that a firm economic policy be adopted, with 
increased output in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, to supply materials 
to boost the war effort. These measures needed to be supported by increased gold 
production, which would boost the Treasury and enable it to finance the war. In terms 
of strategy, he believed the Boer forces should go on the offensive from the outset 
against the British forces assembled across the border in the colonies of Natal and 
the Cape. Smuts believed the Boer forces should immediately grab the initiative and 
gain the upper hand, particularly in Natal, and that the railway line between the Cape 
Colony and Rhodesia should be sabotaged to prevent British aid arriving from that 
quarter.84
In a Clausewitzian context, the available manpower in the two Boer Republics 
constituted a people’s army (militia) – the ideal force for a people fighting on its own 
territory for its freedom and independence.85 The Boer forces formed the purest kind 
of nation-in-arms, with only a very small permanent attachment, mostly made up of 
police and artillery: about 600 state artillery members and 1 400 state police (Zuid-
Afrikaansche Republiek Politie [ZARP]) in the Transvaal and fewer than 400 artillery 
troops in the Orange Free State. All other military sources were drawn from the 
civilian population in the two republics as a militia force. Each district was subdivided 
under two to four field cornets who then elected a commander (commandant) when 
war was declared. The selection of a commander rested mainly on his popularity and 
family connections, rather than his military ability.86
The defects of the Boer military system were also one of the strong points of 
its system, because individualism, personal initiative and the paramountcy of the 
individual and small groups had always been the strength of the Boer militia. The 
individual Boer was someone capable of thinking and reacting for himself, able to 
respond on an individual basis to dangerous situations. However, this characteristic 
disposition was admittedly better suited to scattered forces fighting on their own terms 
than within a larger unit. The shortcoming of individuals thinking independently was 
that they tended to act unilaterally and intuitively – the overall strategy of the larger 
force therefore suffered accordingly.87
The initial restricted mobilisation of the Boer militia demonstrated that their 
leadership approached the conflict as a limited rather than an absolute or an absolute 
war. On the eve of the war, the Boer forces deployed a force of around 35 000 men, 
which represented only 65 per cent of the joint capacity of the two republics. This 
raises the question why the commanders did not employ the full might of the men 
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available from the outset, to provide a ‘killer blow’ to their foe. The Boer leaders’ 
initial strategy was to cut off any reinforcements from the empire by attacking the 
existing forces in Northern Natal, and ensuring that they would not receive help from 
the mainland. It would, however, have been strategically advantageous to employ 
more men from the start and achieve the objective more swiftly by adopting stronger 
offensive strategies. That hesitation – especially on the part of older generals such 
as PJ Joubert and AP Cronjé – led to periods of inactivity, and the Boers’ initial 
successes petered out in drawn-out sieges. The opening campaign, which had 
resulted in spectacular victories during Black Week in early December 1899, was 
not followed up. During the subsequent weeks, the Boer initiatives stagnated as they 
assumed defensive positions or remained immobile, and were unable to overwhelm 
the fortified positions at Kimberley, Mafeking and Ladysmith.88 Attempts at the large-
scale recruitment of Boer sympathisers and a subsequent uprising in the Cape Colony 
largely failed. Initial Boer successes at maintaining defensive positions, such as on 11 
December 1899 at Magersfontein, strengthened the perception that it was the ideal 
strategy to follow. Eventually, however, it was the immobility of the Boer forces 
which led to their defeat at Paardenberg – a pivotal battle, which saw the tide turning 
against the two Boer Republics.89
The two opposing sides’ dissimilar reasons for waging war became more apparent 
immediately after Cronjé’s forces surrendered. In the Clausewitzian idiom, the 
difference lay in their ultimate objectives: either to eliminate their opponent’s political 
independence (absolute war) or fighting to maintain their own independence (people’s 
war).90 After the setback of Cronjé’s surrender, the Boer leaders, Presidents Kruger 
and Steyn, opted to adopt a two-pronged strategy. They decided they would follow 
the route of international diplomacy, while attempting to re-energise the commandos. 
The presidents cabled the British Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury, on 5 March 1900, 
expressing profound sentiments about the war by unambiguously stating their desire 
for peace, but only on the basis that they retained their independence. Kruger and 
Steyn stated in their cable that if the intention of the British government was to 
destroy the sovereignty of the two republics, the Boers would fight to the bitter end.91 
In his response to the communication, Salisbury once again made clear the intention 
of the British government by stating that it was not prepared to accede to the demands 
of either the South African Republic or those of the Orange Free State.92
The Boer leaders were clearly disappointed by the response, although they were 
politically naïve in assuming that the British government would cede to their request 
directly, now that the tide of the war had turned in its favour after being humiliated 
during the opening campaigns. The two presidents, in their communication to the 
British government, also made overtures through diplomatic channels to Germany, 
the United States of America, the Austrian Empire, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Italy, Russia and Switzerland to intervene in the war, with a view to establishing peace. 
They further sent abroad a diplomatic team, consisting of A Fisher, AD Wolmarans 
and CJ Wessels, to negotiate directly with the major powers to intervene93 or assist in 
the war effort.94
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Clausewitz on individuality and the reasons for fighting the war: a theoretical 
and philosophical perspective 
In the preceding subsection, the individuality of the average Boer serving in the 
militia was singled out as a strength within a more restricted form of war. The Boer 
militia were motivated in their struggles and in fighting their opponents by their 
unique strengths and their strong inner belief in the righteousness of their struggle. 
The history of all citizens’ wars (i.e. people’s wars) shows that a nation achieves 
infinitely more by vitalising individual energies than by relying on artificial forms 
of motivation. In this context, the contributing factor is the moral and intellectual 
strength of the individual. In the case of Prussia, it was individuals’ inner strength that 
served to ignite the country’s resistance and success in a people’s war. In his writings, 
Clausewitz emphasises to the Prussian officers that the strength of individuals in small 
wars is the deciding and determining factor when victory is at stake. Reinforcing this 
is the tactical capacity of the individual in a people’s war: in aesthetic terms, having 
morality as a defining trait (an aspect which is absent from most professional armies).
Although Clausewitz abhorred war and the cruelty of it, he continued to refer to 
“beauty of war”95, driven by his strong belief in the value of aesthetics. He formed this 
perspective as a result of the influence of Immanuel Kant and Friedrich Schiller. Kant 
emphasised that knowledge based on experience involves three faculties: sensibility, 
imagination and understanding. The notion of understanding allows an individual to 
compartmentalise experiences according to rational concepts. According to Kant, the 
characteristic feature of the aesthetic experience is therefore that it initiates a process 
in which sensibility (morality) and understanding enter into a free play of harmonious 
activity in which neither gains the upper hand, but one furthers the other and vice 
versa. This clearly indicates that rationality (as understanding) plays a central role in 
the aesthetic experience of morality, without it (rationality being the ultimate arbiter.96
Kant’s idea of beauty comprises a number of features. Beauty is a concrete 
experience, which is sensual without being linked to immediate interests (such as 
sexual desires). It is also social. The experience of beauty has a vitalising effect on all 
human faculties in so far as people enter into a free play of harmonious activity. More 
important to Kant is the fact that the beatifutiful was the symbol of the morally good 
and that the concept of morality inhabits the realm of rationality.97 However, Kant 
emphasises that morality cannot be experienced through the senses, because moral 
notions (such as freedom) cannot be derived in a rational way. The reason is that 
moral notions lack empirical demonstrability. In this sense, the experience of beauty 
is the counterpart of the concept of morality. The first is empirical without arriving 
at a rational concept; the second is conceptual, but devoid of empirical content. It is 
against this background that Clausewitz’s notion of the most beautiful war should be 
understood and interpreted. It is the morality and the moral value of the people who 
participate in a people’s war that motivate them to defend their territory. Clausewitz 
believes a people’s war can overcome any other art of war, because it is the closest to 
the most perfect form of warfare.98 
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In the Clausewitzian idiom, freedom is the next central theme to define the most 
beautiful of wars, as it focuses the motivation and moral fabric of those who fight for 
freedom and independence. For Schiller, “beauty is the only possible expression of 
freedom in appearance”.99 This builds on Kant’s aesthetic theory, which established 
a link between beauty and freedom. That link exists in the sense that the experience 
of beauty liberates the individual from desire, while beauty forms the morality in a 
framework in which freedom plays a central role.100
Within this equation, it is crucial, however, to understand that there are dangers in 
overvaluing rationality over morality and vice versa. Clausewitz argues that Prussia’s 
elites masked their fears as rational decisions and, as a result, became paralysed 
and incapable of action. He points out that fear paralyses reason whereas courage 
embedded in morality energises it. In many societies, freedom is stifled and unable to 
break out of the corruption of the state (elites). A lack of education also asphyxiates 
the attainment of individual freedom. The answer to this impasse is to create a holistic, 
aesthetic state in which individuals are regarded as whole beings, both rational and 
sensible, because they operate from inclination rather than from duty. Only in the 
aesthetic state and within its beauty is it possible to bring together the universal and 
the individual, the will of the whole and the nature of the individual.
Using this Clausewitzian lens, it is possible to deduce that during the South 
African War, the Boer militia and diehards integrated morality and rationality. They 
believed on a moral and a rational level that their battle and continued resistance 
against the imperial powers were both justified and legitimate. Within this unique 
blend of morality and rationality, their strong, individual religious beliefs played an 
important role. The South African Republic under Paul Kruger’s leadership closely 
resembled a theocratic state, with the church in a central and dominant position acting 
as a moral compass. In addition, the Boer leaders believed on rational grounds that 
they could counter the British war effort as they had done so emphatically during the 
Anglo-Transvaal War of 1880–1881, when they relatively easily caught the imperial 
forces on the back foot. The Boer leaders and militia were, as a result, in high spirits 
during the opening weeks of the war, which gave them the capacity to resist and 
even repel the British forces. They believed they were occupying the moral high 
ground, and rationally argued that prolonging the war would prompt the international 
community to intervene on their side in reaction to the ‘immoral war’ imposed on 
them by the British government. The rationale was that a protracted war would tire the 
British forces, leading to more favourable peace terms for the Boers.101
The perfect balance between rationality and morality, which underpinned the South 
African War for the first few months, was severely tarnished after Cronjé’s surrender. 
The initial reinforcement of and confluence between rationality and morality that had 
motivated and reinvigorated the Boer militia to achieve spectacular successes were 
slowly drained as the war dragged on. The red-letter day when the momentum swung 
was 27 February 1900, when two major setbacks occurred. On this date, the British 
forces first managed to break through the Boers’ defensive lines at Pietershoogte on 
the Natal line, and Cronjé on the western front capitulated despite commanding a 
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force of 4 000 men. That loss was destined to have the most devastating impact on 
Boer morale, subsequently undermining their rational belief in their own military 
prowess. The Boers argued that, if a Boer general with almost 4 000 men surrendered, 
what positive outlook was there for the two republics?102 General Piet de Wet, who 
had witnessed the surrender, conceded that the defeat and loss of almost ten per cent 
of the absolute Boer force crushed morale.103
After this, the British forces’ unimpeded progress became a stark reality, with 
overwhelming numbers supported by superior artillery moving into the south-west 
Free State. The demoralised and shrinking numbers of Boer militia were unable, but 
also unwilling, to unite to oppose this absolute onslaught. On a moral level, there 
was a definite notion amongst their ranks that to carry on with a seemingly fruitless 
war against an overwhelming enemy was pointless, because it seemed to have only 
one logical and rational outcome.104 The dispirited Boer militia began melting away 
in the face of the advancing British war machine, having been stripped of the very 
disposition, morality and rationality, which had energised their war effort. Increasing 
numbers began questioning the wisdom of continuing with the war. 
On 11 January 1902, Commandant Vilonel wrote a letter to President Steyn in 
which he referred to the continuation of the war as needless and devastating to their 
own people. Vilonel warned that he and other officers would be compelled to take up 
arms against fellow Boers in a civil war, if the fighting continued.105 His viewpoint 
was rooted in a strong rational and moral position, because he argued that the outcome 
of prolonging the war while women and children suffered in concentration camps 
was, in fact, an immoral position to take. General Piet de Wet took a similar position, 
which created a rift between him and his brother Christiaan.106
The Boer leaders, notably Presidents Kruger and Steyn, did their utmost to reinstate 
a strong sense of morality in their forces, to ensure that they stayed on the battlefield. 
At every available opportunity, these leaders appealed to their men on moral and 
religious grounds to unite and resist the invaders. Kruger travelled to Bloemfontein 
on 5 March 1900 with just that aim, addressing a large assembly of men and women 
at the station. He urged them to fight in the name of their trusted God, reminding them 
that if they truly believed in God, they would be able to defeat the might of the British 
Empire. He referred to those who laid down their arms and returned to their farms as 
not being true believers.107 Kruger’s speech was deeply grounded in religion. Rather 
than restoring the morale of the fighters, there was the growing realisation of a bitter 
reality: the Boer forces were slowly succumbing in the face of the pressure exerted by 
the British war machine.
In early 1900, the sad loss of the integrated rationality and morality that had 
underpinned and motivated the Boer effort up to that point was vividly and cruelly 
exposed on a road south-west of Bloemfontein. On 6 March, President Kruger took 
position next to the road after the British forces had broken through at Poplar Grove. He 
was hoping that by directly appealing and encouraging the retreating and demoralised 
Boer forces he would be able to stop them from fleeing and would convince them 
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to offer resistance. Kruger encouraged the combatants to make a stand and defend 
Bloemfontein, the capital of the Free State. He encouraged them to fight for their 
independence and reminded them that they would be victorious if they stood together. 
However, a large section of the burghers merely shook their heads – to them, their 
farms were more valuable than any capital city. Kruger angrily raised his walking 
stick and desperately instructed the Pretoria police to shoot at the retreating burghers, 
but to no avail – a steady stream of former fighters drained away from the front. The 
undisputed fact was that, morally and rationally, their spirits were broken.108 
The retreating Boer forces and the fall of Bloemfontein on 13 March 1900 served 
as confirmation that the attackers had the upper hand. The zenith was reached when 
the Transvaal government decided not to defend Pretoria. General Smuts, in response, 
asked if Pretoria was not worth fighting for, what was? What would be the point of 
continuing with the war?109 The Clausewitzian notion of the beauty of war as the 
prerogative of those who fight for their independence on their own soil, imbued 
with the integrated strength of morality and rationality, was now just a distant and 
sad memory. On moral and on rational grounds, the ‘joiners’ and, to a lesser extent, 
the ‘hands-uppers’, were no longer prepared to support the Boers’ war efforts. They 
argued that the republics had already been annexed, and that peace would end the 
suffering of the women and children in the concentration camps.110 
However, not all burghers who abandoned the battlefield did so on moral and 
rational grounds, nor did they all take a principled stand on the matter. One noteworthy 
group was disloyal to the Boer cause, led by JG Fraser of the Free State Republic 
Assembly and former presidential candidate and doctor, BO Kellner, the mayor of 
Bloemfontein, who sympathised with the British and handed over the keys to the 
city to Lord Roberts. A significant portion of burghers were merely disinterested in 
prolonging the war. In the opinion of the bittereinders, they were cowards who no 
longer wanted to make an effort to keep fighting, and saw their farms and possessions 
as more important.111 
The Boer forces fragmented into three significant groups, the die-hards or 
bittereinders, the ‘joiners’, and the ‘hands-uppers’ (who resided either with their 
families in the concentration camps or on their farms). This fragmentation was 
significant, given the small number of combatants who initially took a stand. During 
the last six months of the war, 5 464 ‘joiners’ fought on the side of the British and were 
opposed by only 17 000 bittereinders. If the number of Boer prisoners of war is taken 
in account, close to 20 000 ‘hands-uppers’ had opted to abandon the struggle and the 
quest for freedom.112 
This split between the die-hards and the ‘joiners’ or ‘hands-uppers’ was, however, 
not exclusively rooted in the interrelationship between or combination of morality and 
rationality, but it does explain why the bittereinders persisted with the struggle: they 
believed in the justness of their cause. This split amongst the Boer ranks is comparable 
to a civil war, because it developed in a battle between bittereinders and a superior 
British force supported by erstwhile fellow burghers/combatants. 
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On 24 October 1949, a Mrs AC Meyer wrote to Die Volksblad, recounting some of 
the incidents during the war when women on farms were molested by black soldiers 
while the local ‘joiners’ hid on the fringes of the unit, too ashamed about possibly 
being recognised. This sheds light on the treatment of the ‘joiners’ after the war, and 
the people’s deep contempt for and resentment towards them.113 
Concluding remarks
In this article, the argument was made that in true Clausewitzian fashion, the Boer 
militia were a people’s army fighting for independence on home soil. In this idiom, in 
their struggle against a powerful foe, the burghers were imbued with vitality thanks 
to the powerful interrelationship and integration between rationality and morality. 
This strong dual motivating force propelled them into the battle and gave them an 
advantage against a professional British army, which was fighting on different terms.
As explained here, the Boer defeat at Paardenberg and the surrender by almost 
4 000 fighting men demoralised the Boer fighters, dramatically unravelled their moral 
fibre and made them question their sense of rationality. The trickle of dispirited and 
demoralised men who abandoned the war became a stream and later a flood. The 
rolling momentum of the British advances drained the available manpower of the 
Boer militia and diminished any hope of negotiating from a position of strength.
The fundamental question is whether the demoralising effect of the loss of 
integrated morality and rationality could have been prevented. It is doubtful that the 
Boer Republics would have been able to stand their ground in the long run, given the 
empire’s limitless resources and manpower. However, the Boer leaders had neglected 
numerous opportunities to gain the initiative. In Natal, General Piet Joubert refused 
to allow fighters on horseback to strike at the British forces who were defeated and 
scrambled back to Ladysmith. He could have delivered a devastating blow in a 
manner which would have resembled the 1881 victory at Majuba, and that would have 
energised the burghers. In similar fashion, the Boer leaders were unable to translate 
defensive positions into an offensive advantage at Magersfontein, where they had put 
the British on the back foot by attacking their vulnerable opponents.114 The British 
forces were at the mercy of the advancing Boers, who could have captured and seized 
their artillery and provisions, which would have been a devastating logistical tactic 
and a blow to British morale.
Even the defeat at Paardenberg, where Cronjé was forced to capitulate, offered 
an opportunity to regain the initiative and secure the fortunes of the republics. In 
the aftermath at Paardenberg, Lord Roberts’s army was strategically and logistically 
paralysed, his soldiers tired, lacking food, and supplies of ammunition and fodder for 
the horses were at a low. A strong counterattack had a ‘turn-around’ potential, which 
the Boer leaders were unable to exploit.115
However, the pinnacle of strategic blunders occurred on 5 March, when the 
two presidents, Kruger and Steyn, delivered their peace initiative to the British 
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government. Their political, military and strategic naivety was exposed in their belief 
that the British government would settle for peace (after losing many men at the 
beginning of the war) precisely at the juncture where the British were gaining the 
upper hand. If the successes during Black Week had been followed up with one or two 
more victories, the presidents would have been in a position to negotiate for peace 
from a position of strength.
Efforts at international diplomacy, led by Dr WJ Leyds, who had been 
sanctioned to convince European nations to intervene on behalf of the Boers, were 
also undermined because at that stage, the republics’ war efforts were faltering. In 
international relations, it is uncommon for an international power to intervene in a lost 
cause; hence, their reluctance to support the burghers. However, the most damaging 
impact on the Boers’ morale and their rational disposition was that the peace initiative 
created the impression that the two presidents viewed the war as a lost cause, and that 
their men were incapable of winning. The peace initiative left a tangible impression 
that the two Boer governments assumed the war was unwinnable; therefore, they were 
no longer prepared to continue fighting. The poorly timed peace initiative did much 
to dent the burghers’ willingness to continue fighting and contributed to the sense of 
hopelessness that took hold of fighters in the field.116 In the end, the combination of 
rationality and morality, which had energised the men early, on was the determining 
factor that deflated the war effort and divided the nation. 
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